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RECENT CASES
tion organized for the purpose of engaging in farming or agriculture,
does not qualify for the reasonably necessary exception, 6 the su-
preme court after more than thirty-five years of confusion has
settled the question by their decision in Coal Harbor. It seems
clear that a prospective corporation expressly designed to engage
in farming is contrary to section 10-06-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code, and as such it should not be allowed to incorporate.87
By so deciding, the court impliedly found that the legislative intent
was to prohibit corporate farming. It is implicit in such a decision,
that any future change in the law, relaxing the ban on corporate
farming, should come from legislative action and not judicial in-
novation.
It has been suggested that a corporation need only dispose
of all land not reasonably necessary once every ten years, repur-
chase later, and thereby avoid the escheat provisions.8 In so doing,
it is contended that it is possible to effectively circumvent the
corporate farming ban.8 9 There is an obvious fault in this reasoning.
Since the supreme court has determined the legislative intent to
ban corporate farming, a method of circumventing the law resulting
in an abrogation of both the spirit and the letter of the law,
is a proper place for judicial action. The courts must enforce
the spirit, as well as the letter of the law, until the legislature
deems it proper to act.
Apparently after Coal Harbor, the only way for the farmer
to enjoy the basic advantages of incorporation 4 0 is to attempt
to qualify for the co-operative corporation exception. 41 Since cor-
porate farming is now under no circumstances allowable, this seems
the obvious means to achieve the desired result.
ORELL D. SCHMITZ
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS-EQUAL PRO-
TECTION FOR NONRESIDENT BAR APPLICANTS-Plaintiff brought a
class action in Federal District Court seeking an injunction against
the enforcement of a state statute requiring bar applicants to es-
36. Coal Iarbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191 N.W.2d 583, 588 (N.D. 1971).
37. N.D. CENT. CoDs § 10-19-54 (1960) (matters set forth in articles of incorporation
shall be in conformity with law).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-06 (1960).
39. Appellants Brief, at 11. Coal Harbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191 N.W.2d 583
(N.D. 1971).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-31 (1960). This section provides foe limited liability.
For an excellent analysis of the tax benefits see Pearson, The Farm Co-operative and
the Federal Income Tax, 4.4 N.D. L. RLv. 490 (1968).
41. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 10-06-04 (1960).
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tablish residency within the state one year prior to application for
examination and admission.' At the time of his application plaintiff
was clerking in a state licensed law office and concomitantly es-
tablished his domicile therein. He alleged that the routine rejection
of applications which did not satisfy the residency period was a
denial of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court found the statute in question to "create two classes
of bar applicants: (1) those who have resided in Mississippi for
one year preceding the date of application, and (2) those who are
also residents but have not resided in the state for the requisite
time."' 2 Even though members of the second class may have
all the qualifications as those in the first, they are nevertheless
prohibited from applying for examination.3 Accordingly, the lengthy
residing period prior to application was held unconstitutional as
an arbitrary and unreasonable regulation serving no purpose other
than inordinate delay. The court was unable to find any rational
connection between an applicants fitness or capacity to practice
law and living within the state for one year. However, in compliance
with the express severability provision of the statute4 only that
portion requiring residence "for a period of one year preceding
the date of such application ' 5 was invalidated. The remainder
of the statute was expressly found constitutional including the plainly
divisible requirement that the applicant be a resident of the state
when applying for examination. Residency at the time of applica-
tion was not unreasonable inasmuch as it served a legitimate state
interest in having those persons seeking admission to the bar
live within its boundaries. Lipman v. Van Zant 329 F. Supp. 391
(N.D. Miss. 1971).
Historically, Equal Protection problems arise in situations where
a legislature attempts to regulate a class by imposing restrictions
on the various members of the group.6 Justification for such bur-
densome regulations are predicated on the interest which the state
is seeking to protect, usually under the guise of it's police power.7
1. MISS. CODE ANN. § 8654 (1954). Qualifications for Admission:
Thel applicant for admission to the bar, in order to be eligible for
the examination for admission, shall be a citizen of the United States and
an actual bona fide resident of this state for a period of one (1) year preced-
ing the date of such application, above the age of twenty-one (21) years,
of good moral character ...
2. Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 399 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
3. Id. at 399.
4. Miss. LAws ch. 213, § 12 (1954)
If for any reason any section, paragraph, provision, clause or part of
this act shall be held unconstitutional or invalid, that fact shall not affect or
destroy any other section, paragraph, provision, clause or part of the act not
in and of itself invalid, but the remaining portion hereof shall be in force
without regard to that so invalidated.
5. Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 402 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
6. See generally Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
7. See e.g., Dent v, W, Va., 129 1US, 114 (1889).
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To be satisfactory under the United States Constitution the exercise
of that power must bear a reasonable relation to the interest pro-
tected," or where fundamental rights are involved,9 must satisfy
the test by showing a compelling state interest.' 0 Consequently,
in the former case, a classification would be valid if it included
"all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law,"'" as distinguished "upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legis-
lation.' '12 The burden in the latter instance is on the state to
justify the classification, and for the regulation to be upheld, it
must be a "necessary means of achieving a legitimate state pur-
pose."I's
The court in the instant case reached its conclusion on the
constitutionality of the residency requirements by applying the tra-
ditional reasonable-relation-to-state-purpose test and rejected the
stricter compelling state interest standard. 14 The opinion is repre-
sentative of the continuing trend on the part of the judiciary to
examine carefully the validity of state bar residency requirements
as an aid to determining the educational and character qualifica-
tions of an applicant. 5
8. As to bar applicants, the state is Interested in determing that only competent
counsel are licensed to practice law among the citizenry. However, it has been suggested
that residence requirements serve little or no protection to that state or its bar:
residence does not go far to establish a man's character and only careful in-
vestigation of the applicant's former place of residence is apt to disclose those habits
or qualities which would make him an undesirable member of the local bar." Horack,
"Trade Barriers" to Bar Admission, 28 J. AM. Jun. SOC'Y. 102, 103 (1944).
9. Fundamental rights are those aspects of our American heritage which cannot be
abridged by state or federal law and include the individual's right to travel and vote.
Though not specifically listed in the Constitution, such rights being Inherent in our
democratio government are among the penumbra and emanations protected by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. See Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of State of North
Carolina, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) ; cf. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319 (1937)
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. The -purpose of residence requirements may not always be manifest; latent motives
might include the desire of the state and its bar "to discourage, as much as possible,
the entrance of foreign attorneys in order that legal business in their state go exclusively
to their own native attorneys." Dalton & Williams, State Barriers Against Migrant
Lawyers, 25 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 144, 14,7-148 (1957). Such reasoning would not qualify
under either the strict or traditional Equal Protection tests. The application of each
minimally presumes the presence of a legitimate state interest which Is not indicated
by the oppressive suggestion above. See discussion in accompanying text inf ra.
11. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
346 (1949).
12. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va., 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
13. Loving v. Va., 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) ; McLaughlin v. Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964). But where fundamental rights are not infringed by the classification there is
a strong presumption in favor of its validity. McGowan v. Md., 366 U.S. 420, 425-426
(1961) ; Madden v. Ky., 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
14. "[W]e deem the traditional test to be the only one applicable, and that it would
be incorrect to judge any aspect of this ease in terms of the stricter test mandating us,
as a prerequisite to constitutionality, to ascertain either the presence of compelling state
interest or the absence of penalty upon the exercise of the citizen's constitutional rights
of interstate travel." Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 403-404 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
15. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ; Konigs-
berg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) ; Webster v. Woffard, 321 F. Supp.
1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970) ; Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F.
Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971).
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In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico8 for
example, the United States Supreme Court overturned a decision
which had denied an applicant the right to take the New Mexico
bar examination. Plaintiff had satisfied all the criteria set out by
the state in order to qualify for examination but his moral char-
acter was found to be questionable because of his prior subversive
activities. Plaintiff had previously been affiliated with the Com-
munist Party, assumed various aliases, and was arrested on several
occasions. However, because he had since changed his style of
living and offered sufficient proof of an honest effort to reform,
the Court found current satisfaction of moral stability. Recognizing
a violation of Equal Protection, the opinion stated that even though
"[a] State can require high standards of qualification . . . officers
of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for
their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their
action is invidiously discriminatory. ''17
The decision in Schware was affirmed the same day in Konigs-
berg v. State Bar of California18 where the plaintiff's application
was likewise rejected for prior participation in Communist Party
activities. The Supreme Court found that the applicant's refusal to
answer relevant questions on party functions was not a sufficient
justification for declining his application. Unable to submit sufficient
evidence which would rationally support California's refusal to admit
plaintiff, the Court vitiated the state's denial on grounds of due
process and equal protection because the ruling was both "arbitrary
and discriminatory.' 9 Examining in depth the good moral char-
acter criteria of the state and its bar, the decision exacted strict
standards of proof on the state to show that plaintiff was not
so qualified.
A further tracing of this trend is reflected in the recent decision
of Webster v. Woffard,20 where a federal district court struck a
Georgia one year residence requirement. 2' Applying the Equal Pro-
tection standards discussed above, the provision was "declared un-
constitutional insofar as it denies admission to the bar to one who,
though found to be qualified, has not resided in Georgia for twelve
months prior to admission. '2
A similar statute was also invalidated in Keenan v. Board of
16. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
17. Id. at 239.
18. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
19. Id. at 262.
20. Webster v. Woffard, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
21. GA. CODa ANN. § 9-10,3(e) (Supp. 1971). The applicant is allowed to take the
bar examination but cannot be admitted to practice until he has resided in state for
one year.
22. Webster v. Woffard, 321 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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Law Examiners of State of North Carolina.2 8 The court went further
than Lipman or Webster and found an infringement of an individual's
right to interstate travel in the absence of a compelling state
interest. Commenting on the unreasonableness of the classification
between resident and non-resident applicants the Keenan court
stated:
[W]hile the one year residency requirement may deny li-
censes to some applicants who lack character or competence,
it also bars, arbitrarily and capriciously, applicants who
are eminently qualified for admission. Its constitutional in-
firmity is 'over-inclusion' . . . It burdens some who, because
of unfitness or incompetence should not be licensed to prac-
tice; but it also injures others who are both fit and capable.
There are here no exigent circumstances justifying such
over inclusion.
24
The opinion above would seemingly have offered strong precedent
for the Lipman court to adopt and expand the compelling state
interest test. However, on analagous facts the instant court pre-
dicated its decision on the traditional test by not finding an in-
fringement upon the applicant's fundamental right to interstate
travel. In applying the less stringent standard, Lipman was appar-
ently acting with great deference to the state by refusing to question
further the discretion of its legislature.
In regard to residency, appropriate arguments may also be
found in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court in Shapiro
v. Thompson25 invalidated a state's one year residence requirement
for welfare benefits indicating the existence of an unconstitutional
infringement on the fundamental right to interstate travel.2 It
is interesting to note that Keenan and Shapiro did not express an
opinion on the validity of short term residency requirements2 7 while
Lipman limited its decision to upholding residency contemporaneous
to application. Not commenting on the permissible length of such
requirements, the instant court implicitly leaves open two important
questions: (1) Are pre-admission residency requirements which are
longer in time than the Mississippi statute, but shorter than one
year, constitutional? (2) Do such short term residency requirements
23. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of State of North Carolina, 317 F. Supp.
1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
24. Id. at 1360 (footnotes omitted).
25. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
26. See also Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). The
Supreme Court recognized that a Japanese citizen's right to fish and earn a living was
fundamental and subject to the compelling state interest test. It would not seem un-
reasonable to extend the logic of this decision to find that a bar applicant and attorney
also have fundamental rights to earn a living In practicing their profession.
27. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of North Carolina, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1362
n.17 (E.D.N.C. 1970) ; Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618. 638 n.21 (1969).
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impinge upon an individual's right to interstate travel, and if so,
would such requirements satisfy the compelling state interest test?2 18
From an historical point of view, the state has always had a
legitimate interest in determining the qualifications of the members
of its bar. The Supreme Court in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona29
found that the practice of law is a matter of right only for one who
is qualified by his learning and moral character. In this regard
however, unrestricted regulation is unfounded and "it is clear that
state control of the practice of law is not plenary, but is . . . subject
to restraints . . . imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 30 Fur-
ther, recent alternatives have appeared to render residency require-
ments unnecessary to achieve the purpose of examining an appli-
cant's character and educational qualifications. One commentator,
for example, has noted that "[I]llinois . . . permits nonresident
admission to the bar if the applicant intends to practice within
the state, presumably on the assumption that actual practice is
more relevant than residence for encouraging competence in local
law."
In line with current Constitutional standards, North Dakota is
among the states statutorily maintaining minimal residence require-
ments3 2 while apparently demanding strict professional qualifica-
tions among applicants, members of the bar, and a continuing
interest in the law school itself. 3 The authority to appoint a Board
of Bar Examiners has been vested at different times in the Supreme
Court of North Dakota, 4 the Governor, 35 and since 1923 has re-
mained under the guidance of the former.3 6 In 1964, pursuant to
an order of the North Dakota Supreme Court, 37 the current bar
admission statute was enacted setting forth qualifications to be
met by applicants requiring inter alia good moral character, edu-
28. Most states require some period of residency -prior to or at the time of examin-
ation or admission. For an exacting analysis of state statutes and rules regarding bar
residency requirements see Note, Residency Requirements for Initial Admission to the
Bar: A Compromise Proposal For Change, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 831 n.4 et seq. (1971).
See also 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY, ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS (1972).
29. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1970).
30. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of State of North Carolina, 317 F. Supp.
1350, 1353 (E.D.N.C. 1970); of. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico,
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
31. Note, Attornejs: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HAmv. L. REv. 1711, 1716
(1967) (footnotes omitted).
32. In North Dakota residency for bar applicants is required at the time of ap-
plication for admission. N.D. CENr. CODE § 27-11-03 (Supp. 1971).
33. See 43 N.D. L. REv. 201 (1966): See also Crum, The History of the University of
North Dakota School of Law, 35 N.D. L. REV. 5 (1959).
34. N.D. SESS. LAWS ch. 50 (1905).
35. N.D. SESS. LAWS ch. 69 (1919).
36. N.D. SESS. LAWS ch. 134 (1923).
37. In re Order for Adoption and Promulgation of a RULE of the Supreme Court
Pertaining to Qualifications of Applicants FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE in the State
of North Dakota, 132 N.W.2d 924, 926 (N.D. 1964).
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cational specifications, and residency at the time of application
for admission. 8
Commentators have expressed favorable opinions as to the de-
sirability of minimal residency requirements 9 while the length
of such periods remain currently debatable. Lipman in failing to
recognize the presence of a fundamental right, avoided the appli-
cation of the strict compelling state interest test which would place
such short term pre-admission residency requirements for bar ap-
plicants on a doubtful constitutional footing. The significance of
the decision can be appreciated with the recognition that many
states require six months of residency" while most others vary
in decreasing magnitude.41 The logical extension of Lipman in
light of the Keenan decision would seem to indicate further abro-
gation of residency requirements in the future, with a narrowing
definition of their permissible length measured against a demon-
strable state interest.
PAUL E. GODLEWSKI
INTOXICATING LIQUORS - PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY - LIA--
BILITY OF TAVERN OWNER FOR TORTS COMMITTED BY INTOXICATED
PATRON-Appellant, motorist, brought an action against a tavern
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-03 (Supp. 1971).
39. Note, Residence Requirements For Initial Admission To The Bar: A Com-
promise Proposal For Change, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 843 (1971). See generally
Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions, 28 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 102 (1944); Note,
Restrictions on Admission to the Bar: B%-Product of Federalism, 98 U. PA. L. REv.
710 (1950).
40. The validity of a six month residency requirement for bar applicants now appears
to be questionable after the recent decision of Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme
Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii, 1971). Plaintiff was a member of the
armed services stationed in Hawaii and had statutorily qualified for the bar examination
in all respects except for residency. A statute required all voters over the age of fifteen
years-six months to reside within the state six months before being eligible to register.
By Hawaii Supreme Court Rules, rule 15(c), all bar applicants had to be eligible re-
gistered voters in order to qualify for examination. The Federal District Court found a
violation of Equal Protection stating:
The periods of required residency in the statute and the rule here bear
no valid relation to the educational and moral qualifications of bar appli-
cants, and are thereby arbitrary and capricious and constitutionally imper-
missible. Both the act and the rule thus severally invidiously discriminate
against an identifiable class, favoring registered voters or six-months re-
sidents over otherwise equally qualified applicants who have not the same
residential status.
Id. at 1398.
In applying the traditional test, Potts, along with Shapiro, Webster, and Lipman
left no indication as to the presence or absence of a compelling state interest. Effectively
avoiding the latter issue the Potts court opined:
By so holding, we need not consider plaintiff's contention that the residency
requirements impermissibly penalize his constitutional rights to interstate
travel or any other constitutional right.
Id. at 1398.
41. See Note, Residence Requirements For Initial Admission To The Bar: A Com-
promise Proposal For Change, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (1971).
